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THE PARENTAL RIGHTS OF UNWED FATHERS: A
DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE
KARA

L. BOUCHER AND RUTHANN M. MACOLINI*
UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA - LINCOLN

Unwed fathers have traditionally been treated differently than either
unwed or married mothers and fathers. This article will focus on situations in which the unwed father seeks parental rights after the mother
relinquishes the child for adoption and discuss the present state of the
law and its relationship to developmental psychology. While some
courts allow the parental rights of unwed fathers to predominate over the
interests of third parties, too many continue to place insufficient weight
upon the parental rights of unwed fathers.
Courts treat unwed fathers inconsistently across jurisdictions, generally focusing on the existence and quality of the relationship between the
unwed father and his child without consulting relevant social science
literature. As a result, judges may be making decisions which are directly in conflict with the applicable developmental research. These decisions, relying on outdated or discredited literature, assume precedential
value. By failing to consult the most relevant and current research,
courts are foregoing the opportunity to improve the quality of their decision-making.
REVIEW OF THE LAW

Legitimate children historically were treated as property of their fathers;' illegitimate children were considered children of no one.2 Illegitimate children eventually began to be regarded solely as the children of
their mother.3 Statutes were enacted which granted mothers almost ex* Both authors currently are pursuing doctoral degrees in the law/psychology program at the
University of Nebraska-Li:ncoln. Kara L. Boucher: A.B. 1986 Washington University in St. Louis,
J.D. 1990 University of Nebraska-Lincoln; Ruth M. Macolini: B.A. 1983 University of Denver, M.S.
1985 Augusta College, J.D. 1989 University of Nebraska-Lincoln.
1. See, e.g., 4 L. WARDLE, C. BLAKESLEY, & J. PARKER, CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW:
PRINCIPALS, POLICY AND PRACTICE § 39.05 (1988); Note, Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Services Bureau: For an Unwed Father, Five Days is Forever, 20 CREIGHTON L. REV. 647, 648 (1987) [hereinafter Shoecraft]; Comment, A Modern-Day Solomon's Dilemma: What of the Unwed Father's Rights?,
66 U. DET. L. REV. 267, 269 (1989) [hereinafter Dilemma].
2. See, e.g., S. BRECKINRIDGE, THE FAMILY AND THE STATE: SELECT DOCUMENTS 415
(1972); Shoecraft, supra note 1.
3. See, e.g., S. BRECKINRIDGE, supra note 2; Dilemma, supra note 1; Shoecraft, supra note 1.
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clusive rights to their children, both legitimate and illegitimate, in almost
any dispute. 4 Recently, fathers of legitimate children were given increased opportunity to obtain custody of their children in custody disputes; fathers of illegitimate children continued, in most jurisdictions, to
have little or no rights to their children.6
In the past twenty years, unwed fathers have begun to employ the
fourteenth amendment to challenge the automatic denial of their parental rights. The United States Supreme Court has decided a number of
cases concerning this issue.7 In defining the legal rights of unwed fathers
and the extent to which they are constitutionally protected, the cases
have sometimes been unclear.8 As a result, states have developed a variety of statutory schemes to govern the termination of parental rights of
unwed fathers.9 These statutes attempt both to facilitate adoption of
children born out of wedlock and provide adequate protection for the
due process and equal protection rights of unwed fathers.
The fourteenth amendment prohibits states from depriving a citizen of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law and entitles all citizens to equal protection under state law.' 0 Both the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the fourteenth amendment have been used to
challenge state statutory schemes with respect to unwed fathers and their
children.
The existence and nature of the constitutional rights of unwed fathers
with respect to their children were considered by the Court in the watershed case of Stanley v. Illinois," where an Illinois statute 2 denied an
unwed father custody of his children upon the death of their mother.
Under the statute, the rights of married fathers and unwed mothers
13
could not be terminated absent judicial determination of unfitness.
Stanley contended that the Illinois statute unconstitutionally denied him
due process. The Court stated that "[t]he private interest here, that of a
man in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference, and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection .... The
rights to conceive and to raise children have been deemed 'essential'."' 4
4. See, e.g., L. WARDLE, C. BLAKESLEY, & J. PARKER, supra note 1; Shoecraft, supra note 1.
5. See, e.g., L. WARDLE, C. BLAKESLEY, & J. PARKER, supra note I at § 39.06.
6. See, e.g., Marianne M. DeMarco, Comments, Delineationof the Boundaries of Putative Fathers' Rights: A Psychological ParenthoodPerspective, 15 SETON HALL L. REV. 290, 296 (1985).
7. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1977);
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
8. See Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Serv. Bureau, Inc., 385 N.W.2d 448, 453 (Neb. 1986)
(Krivosha, C.J. dissenting).
9. See infra notes 45 to 56 and accompanying text.
10. U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
11. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
12. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 37, § 701-14 (1985).
13. Id.
14. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 651 (1972).
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While recognizing the state's interests in expediency and the protection of children born out of wedlock, the Court stated that "the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency" and that the Due
Process Clause, in particular, is designed to protect these higher values.' 5
The Illinois statute created a presumption that unwed fathers were unfit,
ignoring "the determinative issues of competence and care."' 6 The
Court concluded that the interest of Stanley in his children outweighed
the state's interest in efficiency and speed.' Furthermore, were Stanley
found to be a fit parent, the state's interest in the welfare of children born
out of wedlock would be served by allowing the children to remain in his
custody. 8 Accordingly, the Court held that the Illinois statute, in failing
to provide the unwed father with a hearing before the state took custody
of his children, violated the Due Process Clause.' 9
The Court in Stanley placed great emphasis on the fact that Stanley
had a long-standing relationship with his children and had contributed to
their support.2" The Court used these factors to distinguish later cases
from Stanley.2 '
The extent of unwed fathers' rights was next addressed in Quilloin v.
Walcott2 2 where an unwed father sought to block the adoption of his
eleven year old by the child's stepfather. The father challenged the constitutionality of a Georgia statute23 which provided that an unwed father's consent was not required for the adoption of his child absent
legitimation of the child. The father claimed that this provision violated
his due process rights by terminating his parental rights without a hearing. Although affirming that the "relationship between parent and child
is constitutionally protected," the Court upheld the statute with respect
to the Due Process Clause.24 In doing so, the Court relied upon the fact
that in Quilloin, unlike in Stanley, the father did not regularly contribute
to the support of his child.2" In Quilloin, the unwed father had never
sought actual or legal custody of his child." 26 The Court found that the
state's interests outweighed those of the unwed father under the
circumstances. 27
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 656.
Id. at 657.
Id. at 656.
Id. at 652-653.
Id at 657-658.
Id. at 655.
See infra notes 22 to 43 and accompanying text.
434 U.S. 246 (1977).
GA. CODE ANN. § 74-403(3) (1975).
434 U.S. at 255.
Id. at 251.
Id. at 255.
Id. at 244-55.
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In Lehr v. Robertson,28 the Court considered a contention that a New
York statute's 29 provisions violated an unwed father's due process rights.
Under the statute, in order for an unwed father to obtain the right to
legal notice and hearing in an adoption proceeding, he must first register
in a putative father registry.3" At the time of the adoption proceeding,
the unwed father had failed to register, even though two years had
elapsed since the birth of his child. He had not contributed to the support of or established a relationship with the child. The Court responded
to the father's action as follows:
[t]he significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural
father an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring.... If he fails to do so, the Federal Constitution
will not compel
a State to listen to his opinion of where the child's best
3
interests lie.
The Court found that the state had a duty to adequately protect the un-

wed father's opportunity to form a relationship with his child; to fail to
do so would be a denial of due process.32 In Lehr, the Court held that
the New York statute adequately protected the father's opportunity, but

the father had failed to exercise the opportunity.33
The United States Supreme Court cases involving unwed fathers have
dealt with equal protection arguments as well as due process claims. In
Stanley, the unwed father contended that the Illinois statute, which made
his children wards of the state after their mother's death, violated his
equal protection rights. The Court struck down the statute on these
grounds, as well as on due process grounds, because the statute rested on
the assumption that unwed fathers were unfit parents while requiring
hearings to determine the fitness of married fathers and unwed
mothers.34
Quilloin also presented an equal protection question. The Court held

that the unwed father's "interests... [were] readily distinguishable from
those of a separated or divorced father, and accordingly ... the state
could permissibly give the appellant [the unwed father] less veto authority than it provided to a married father."3 The Court based the distinction on the fact that the unwed father had "never exercised actual or
legal custody over his child and thus . . . [had] never shouldered any
significant responsibility with respect to the daily supervision, education,
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

463 U.S. 248 (1983).
N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW §§ IIl-a(2), IIl-a(3) (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1990).
Id.
463 U.S. at 262 (1983).
Id. at 262-66.
Id.
405 U.S. at 658.
434 U.S. at 256.
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protection, or care of the child."3' 6
In Caban v. Mohammed,37 the Court struck down a New York statute3" that provided that an unwed father's consent was not required for
the adoption of his child. The Court stated as follows: "such a statutory
[gender-based] classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must
rest on some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to
the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced
shall be treated alike." 39 The Court, recognizing that "maternal and paternal roles are not invariably different in importance," especially for
children who are not newborns, held that the parents were similarly situated with respect to their children. 4 The children were older and had
relationships with both of their parents. Since the statute failed to treat
similarly situated parents equally, the Court held that the statute was
unconstitutional.4
The natural parents need not have identical relationships with their
child to be similarly situated under the Caban analysis. This conclusion
becomes clear upon examining the equal protection analysis in Lehr.
The Court in Lehr held that the natural parents were not similarly situated, as the parents in Caban were, because the father had not come
forward to participate in the raising of his child.4 2 "If one parent has an
established custodial relationship with the child and the other parent has
either abandoned or never established a relationship, the Equal Protecnot prevent a State from according two parents different
tion Clause does
43
legal rights."

Following these Supreme Court cases, both state legislatures and
courts focused on the relationship between an unwed father and his child
as an index of the father's legal rights with respect to his child; however,
a number of critical questions were left unresolved by the Supreme Court
cases. What sort of opportunity to form a relationship with his child
must an unwed father be afforded? How must an unwed father go about
grasping such an opportunity? What are the proper criteria to examine
in determining whether there is a relationship worthy of constitutional
protection between an unwed father and his child? State legislatures and
courts have taken widely varying positions on these questions, often
without guidance from relevant developmental literature or based upon
outdated or discredited assumptions.'
36. Id.
37. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
38. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111 (McKinney 1977).

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 391 (1979).
Id. at 389.
Id. at 382-389.
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265-68 (1983).
Id. at 267-68.
See infra notes 60 to 88 and accompanying text.

Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1992

5

North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 20, No. 1 [1992], Art. 5

50

NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 20:45

State statutes vary considerably in their definition of unwed fathers'
rights when their children are the subjects of adoption proceedings.
States' approaches differ as to whether the unwed father's consent is necessary and whether he is entitled to notice.4 5 Some states provide for
notice of the proceedings under some circumstances but not consent to
There are
the adoption;4 6 some provide for consent but not notice.
nearly as many mechanisms and criteria for notice and/or consent as
there are states. Some statutes are ambiguous on the matter, stating that
notice and/or consent is not required unless the unwed father has acknowledged the child. 48 Other statutes require inquiry into the relationship between the unwed father and his child.4 9 Some statutes contain
detailed criteria which, if met by the unwed father, entitle him to notice
of the adoption proceedings, an opportunity to be heard at those proceedings, or both. Criteria include the presence of the father's name of
the child's birth certificate,50 the father's contact with the child,' the
father's financial contribution to the child 2 or to the mother during her
pregnancy,5 3 and, quite commonly, some sort of measure designed to acknowledge the child.5 4 This acknowledgement can take many forms, in45. Very few statutory schemes require unqualified consent of and notice to the unwed father.
See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-106, 8-111 (1990); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-304, 16-306
(1990). A few statutes completely foreclose participation by the unwed father. See, e.g., IOWA CODE
ANN. §§ 600.7, 600.11 (West 1989); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-5 (1990).
46. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-10-3 (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-9-206, 9-9-207, 9-9-224
(1987 & Supp. 1990); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.42 (West 1989-90).
47. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 908 (1990); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 536 (1988); V.I.
CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 142, 143 (1990).
48. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 109.092 (1989); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 435, 441 (Supp.
1990).
49. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 578-2 (1985 & Supp. 1990); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111
(1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1690 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
50. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004 (West Supp. 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-105 (Supp.
1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1114 (1990); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111 -a (McKinney 1991); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.06 (Baldwin 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 29.1 (West 1990); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 20-7-1734 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-6-1.1 (1991); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 36-1-111 (Supp. 1990).
51. This includes situations in which the child is residing or has resided with the father or in
which the father has maintained regular contact with the child. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 74-406
(Supp. 1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-7-35 (1991); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 111, I1 l-a (McKinney
1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 29.1 (West 1990); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.096 (1989); S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 20-7-1690, 20-7-1734 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-111 (Supp.
1990).
52. For the purposes of this discussion, only voluntary child support is considered. See, eg.,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.062 (West 1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-406 (Supp. 1989); N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAW § 111 (McKinney 1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.096 (1989); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1690
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
53. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 74-406 (Supp. 1989); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § Il l (McKinney
1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.07 (Baldwin 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 60.5, 60.6
(West 1990); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1690 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 48.415
(West 1990).
54. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-422.14 (West Supp. 1990); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 170-B:5, 170-B:5-a (West 1990 & Supp. 1990); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-17-04 (Supp. 1989).
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cluding filing a paternity action5 5 or registering as the child's father in a
specialized registry. 6 Courts tend to become engaged in evaluating the
nature of the relationship between father and child, either through explicit statutory language or constitutional challenge to the statute.
Often, courts focus primarily, or even exclusively, upon the father's
financial relationship with the child and the child's mother. For example, in Thorne v. Padgett," a Georgia appellate court held that "a simple
finding of 'significant failure' to support is sufficient", 58 despite the fact
that the unwed father had been imprisoned and had made considerable
efforts to maintain contact with his child. Although later reversed by the
Georgia Supreme Court5 9 , the appellate court's holding illustrates the
emphasis placed upon financial support to the exclusion of other factors.
This emphasis is shared by many courts.' While financial support may
be a valuable indicator of a father's interest in his child in some circumstances, the tendency of courts to focus so extensively upon it may also
be an indication of a stereotyped view of the father's role in the family
and his parenting abilities. 6 '
Another aspect of this archaic stereotype is the pervasive view that the
55. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-10-3 (1990); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.050 (1984 & Supp. 1990);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.062 (West 1990); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.500 (Baldwin 1991); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 4A (West 1987); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111-a (McKinney 1991);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.06 (Baldwin 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10. §§ 60.5. 60.6 (West
1990); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.092 (1989); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-6-1.1 (1991); W. VA. CODE
§§ 48-4-1, 48-4-3 (1991); WYO. STAT. § 1-22-108 (1991).
56. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5-105 (Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.062 (West
1990); IDAHO CODE § 16-1513 (Cum. Supp. 1990); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 4A (West
1987); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-6-126, 40-6-127 (1990); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 126.051, 127.040
(1989); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111-a (McKinney 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 29.1 (West
1990); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.092 (1989); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-111 (Supp. 1990); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 48.025 (West 1989-90).
57. 383 S.E.2d 160 (Ga. App. 1989).
58. Id. at 161.
59. Thorne v. Padgett, 386 S.E.2d 155 (Ga. 1989).
60. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Strawser, 522 N.E.2d 1105 (Ohio App. 1987); In re Horbatenko,
531 N.E.2d 1011 (111. App. 1988); Matter of Adoption of R.G.C., 742 P.2d 471 (Mont. 1987); Matter
of Estate of Becton, 474 N.E.2d 1318 (Ill. App. 1985); Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Services, 761 P.2d
932 (Utah App. 1988).
61. See, e.g., Adoption of G, 529 A.2d 809 (Me. 1987). The continued prejudice against unwed
fathers may be illustrated by both academic and popular sources. For example, Schwartz denigrates
unwed fathers' motives for seeking parental rights, relying solely on limited anecdotal evidence. She
suggests that the mothers are best able to judge the parental fitness of the fathers and their decisions
should not be overridden. This approach would vest constitutional decision-making in unwed
mothers who have already relinquished their parental rights. Schwartz, Unwed Fathersand Adoption Custody Disputes, 14 AMER. J. FAM. THERAPY 347 (1986). Writing from a feminist perspective,
Pollock and Sutton view any consideration of unwed fathers' rights as a dimunition of mothers'
rights. In their view, mothers should have exclusive authority to determine the placement of their
children. Pollock & Sutton, Fathers' Rights, Women's Losses, 8 WOMEN'S STUDIES INT'L FORUM
593 (1985). Attorneys involved in adoption cases may also harbor these prejudices. See, e.g., Transcript, The Jane Wallace Show, Father's Birthrights in the Adoption Process, Dec. 6, 1989 (available
from LIFETIME Productions, Inc.).
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man's relationship with his child can be determined to a large extent by
whether he proposes marriage to the child's mother.6 2 In some jurisdictions, a mere proposal is insufficient to demonstrate interest in a child;
the mother must accept the proposal and the couple must participate in a
marriage ceremony.6 3 Failure to marry the mother is often considered
abandonment of the child." Because abandonment of the child is
grounds for termination in every jurisdiction,6 5 a father's parental rights
may be placed in the exclusive control of the mother through her acceptance or rejection of his proposal.
Many courts continue to place undue emphasis upon the father's financial contributions to the mother and/or the child as well as the father's
relationship to the mother. A review of the developmental literature
reveals information which the courts could utilize in modifying their
views of the family and evaluating the relationship of the unwed father
and his child."
The developmental literature also casts doubt upon the wisdom of filing options, particularly in states in which such options are the sole or
primary means available for the unwed father to secure his parental
rights.6 While courts have upheld these filing statutes as constitutional
in the abstract,6 8 they are often forced to engage in examination of the
father's relationship with his child on a case by case basis to determine
whether the statute has been unconstitutionally applied.69 The states
with filing statutes provide particularly interesting examples of the confusing and often conflicting resolution of the parental rights of unwed
fathers. Two states with strict filing requirements, Nebraska and Utah,
are considered below.
Nebraska and Utah both have time-limited filing requirements as the
sole means of preserving the parental rights of unwed fathers. Nebraska's statute requires filing within five days of the child's birth.7"
62. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 578-2 (1985). See also Sanchez v. L.D.S. Social Servs., 680
P.2d 753 (Utah 1984); Adoption of Baby Girl S., 535 N.Y.S.2d 676, 141 Misc.2d 905 (Sur. Ct. 1988);
A.F. v. Spence Chapin Agency, 537 N.Y.S.2d 752, 142 Misc.2d 412 (Fan. Ct. 1989).
63. See, e.g., CALIF. CIV. CODE § 7004 (West 1983); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 19-6-105 (1986).
64. For example, the court in Adoption of Hutto, 777 S.W.2d 353 (Tenn. 1989) affirmed a trial
court decision which granted the unwed father parental rights in part based upon his attempt to
marry the mother. Some courts have taken an enlightened approach which differentiates the father's
relationship with the mother from his relationship with his child. For instance, Adoption of R.M.H.,
538 So.2d 477, 479 (Fla. App. 1989) held "that a child must be born before it can be abandoned."
Under this sound position, failure to propose marriage to the child's mother cannot be used as the
sole basis for termination of the father's parental rights.
65. See, e.g., 3 L. WARDLE, C. BLAKESLEY, & J. PARKER, supra note 1, at § 28.08.
66. See infra notes 96 to 147 and accompanying text.
67. Id.
68. Ellis v. Soc. Servs. Dept. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 615 P.2d 1250
(Utah 1980); Shoecraft v. Catholic Soc. Serv. Bureau, Inc., 222 Neb. 574, 385 N.W.2d 448 (1986).
69. See infra notes 79 to 87 and accompanying text.
70. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-104.02 (Reissue 1984).
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Utah's statutes require that the father file prior to the child's relinquishment for adoption, regardless of how soon after the child's birth relinquishment occurs. 7' Both states' supreme courts have upheld the
statutes under constitutional challenge, finding them appropriate means
of furthering the state interest of encouraging quick and certain adoptions.72 The statutes were held to provide an adequate opportunity for
unwed fathers to assert their parental rights.73 Yet, in both states, the
courts have been forced to evaluate father-child relationships in individual cases in which the statutes were held to have unconstitutionally deprived the unwed fathers of their rights or opportunities to form
relationships with their children. 74 Ironically, this continuing case-bycase analysis may create the very uncertainty the legislatures sought to
avoid by requiring filing and may also frustrate the state's interest in
rapid adoption.
In Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Services,75 the Nebraska Supreme Court
upheld the Nebraska statute under constitutional attack. The natural
parents in Shoecraft had extensive discussions about the child before his
birth. The father knew of the possibility that the mother would relinquish the child for adoption. He was not aware of the state's filing requirement and did not file until nine days after the child's birth, four
days beyond the statutory filing limit. The court emphasized the state's
compelling interest in encouraging adoption of children born out of wedlock.76 The court was also concerned with the possibility that prospective adoptive parents would be unwilling to adopt if the unwed father's
interests could not be ascertained quickly. 7 7 The court then examined
the means by which the legislature sought to accommodate these interests. It supported the five-day period, saying that it was the standard
length of time for the mother and child to remain in the hospital. 7
A year after the Shoecraft decision, the Nebraska court held that the
statute was unconstitutionally applied to the specific factual situation in
In Re Application of S.R.S. and M.B.S. 79 The court delved deeply into
the nature of the relationship between the unwed father and his son, who
71. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-30-4(3), 78-30-12 (1987).

72. See supra note 70.
73.

Ellis v. Social Serv. Dept., 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1980); Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Serv.

Bureau, Inc., 385 N.W.2d 448 (Neb. 1986).
74. See, e.g., Wells v. Children's Aid Soc'y, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984); In re Application of
S.R.S. and M.B.S., 408 N.W.2d 272 (Neb. 1987); Matter of K.B.E., 740 P.2d 292 (Utah App. 1987);

Swayne v. L.D.S. Soc. Servs., 761 P.2d 932 (Utah App. 1988); T.R.F. v. Felan, 760 P.2d 906 (Utah
App. 1988).

75. 385 N.W.2d 448 (Neb. 1986).
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 452.
Id.
Id.
408 N.W.2d 272 (Neb. 1987).
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was two years of age at the time he was placed for adoption.8' While
explicitly reaffirming the constitutionality of the statute in the abstract,
the court held that it violated the equal protection clause in S.R.S., where
the unwed father had established a relationship with his child.8 A concurring opinion in S.R.S. pointed out the inherent conflicts created by
S.R.S. and Shoecraft as follows:
To have the constitutionality of a law such as this depend in each instance upon the facts determined after the fact is to fly in the very face of
the act's purpose.... [T]his court has now ruled... that if [a] child is
removed, from the natural mother while in the hospital, thereby making
it impossible for the natural father to establish a relationship with the
child, the act will be held constitutional; but, if the natural mother delays... so that the natural father has an opportunity to develop a relationship with the child, the act will be declared unconstitutional ....Such
uncertainty is bound to create much distress.... The scenario.. .will
continue to repeat itself in future cases.8 2
The holdings of these two cases taken in combination illustrate the potential increase in adoption litigation, expense, uncertainty, and delay
under filing statutes.
The Utah Supreme Court has encountered the detrimental effects of
case-by-case appellate analysis of the unwed father's relationship with his
child. Utah trial courts frequently rely upon the filing statute to exclude
the unwed father from his child's adoption proceeding, only to have their
application of the statute reconsidered and, often, overturned by appellate courts.8 3 The Utah Supreme Court continues to uphold the general
constitutionality of the statute. It does so on the basis of its perception of
the "state has a strong interest in speedily identifying those persons who
will assume the parental role over such children, not just to assure immediate and continued physical care but also to facilitate early and uninterrupted bonding of a child to its parents.8 4 This emphasis on immediate
bonding is misplaced. The developmental literature, as discussed below,
rejects the notion that immediate bonding is of crucial importance in parent-child relationships.8 "
The Utah and Nebraska experiences illustrate the difficulty courts
have in dealing with the issue of unwed fathers' rights. Underlying the
decisions in these states are assumptions about bonding and unwed fathers that are in conflict with, placed in doubt by, or, at least, unsup80. Id. at 275-278.
81. Id at 279.
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., Wells v. Children's Aid Society, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984); Sanchez v. LDS Social
Services, 680 P.2d 753 (Utah 1984); In re Adoption of Baby Boy Doe, 717 P.2d 686 (Utah 1986);
Matter of K.B.E., 740 P.2d 292 (Utah App. 1987); T.R.F. v. Felan, 760 P.2d 906 (Utah App. 1988).
84. Wells v. Children's Aid Society, 681 P.2d 199, 203 (Utah 1984).
85. See infra notes 99 to 104 and accompanying text.
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ported by current developmental literature.8 6
Judges have been trained to compare the facts of present cases with the
facts of those resolved previously and to render decisions that maintain
the integrity of those precedents, barring unusual circumstances.8 7 Many
cases relied upon as precedent, however, have failed to take advantage of
the guidance provided by the developmental literature concerning parent-child relationships.8 8 The overwhelming tangle of due process, equal
protection, fundamental right to raise children, maternal preference, and
best interest of the child has made applying strict precedence nearly impossible. Social scientists could aid legal decision-makers in their unenviable task by investigating the ability of each of the sexes to parent and the
psychological ramifications of relationships between parents and
children.
A number of assumptions continue to underlie decision-making in the
context of unwed fathers' rights. While often not explicitly stated, these
assumptions directly conflict with much of the developmental literature.
These assumptions include the following: fathers are not as capable as
mothers in childcareg; unwed fathers are less capable than married or
divorced fathers;' bonding of an infant to a parent occurs exclusively
during the first month of a child's life9 1 .
REVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL LITERATURE

The timing of attachment formation is particularly relevant to the issue at hand. State court decisions, by insisting that attachments are
formed almost from birth, are greatly lagging behind social science research. 92 In many court cases, Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit 93 or Klaus
and Kennell9 4 are cited or indirectly relied upon." These works empha86. Id.
87.

As Monahan and Walker have discussed, social science evidence that is accepted by courts

becomes binding precedent. Future research which is more complete may alter the state of this
evidence. Courts have difficulty responding to these changes in social science literature. Monahan &

Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining,Evaluating, andEstablishingSocial Science in Law, 134 U. PA.
L. REV. 477 (1986).
88. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979). The Court discussed the nature of
maternal and paternal relationships with children without benefit of scientific research.
89. Buchanan, The ConstitutionalRights of Unwed FathersBefore and After Lehr v. Robertson,
45 OHIO ST. L. J. 313 (1984); Weitzman, Child Custody: From Maternal Preference to Joint Custody?, in THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 215 (1985).

90. Buchanan, supra note 89.
91. See, e.g., Wells v. Children's Aid Soc'y, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984); Erickson v. Doe, 547
N.Y.S.2d 807, 145 Misc.2d 557 (Fain. Ct. 1989).
92. 681 P.2d at 203.
93. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD

(1973); J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SOLNrT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
(1979); J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, A. SOLNIT, & S. GOLDSTEIN, IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE
CHILD (1986).
94. M. KLAUS & J. KENNELL, PARENT-INFANT BONDING (2d ed. 1982).
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size the formation of bonds within the first weeks of life and the inflexibility of these bonds.96 These works are insufficient because they fail to
consider current research, which demonstrates that children do not exhibit signs of attachment prior to six months of age. 97
Researchers have generally found that measures of attachment do not
yield positive findings before babies are six to eight months of age.98
Before that age, infants do not appear to exhibit attachment behaviors to
any particular person.99 This may be attributed to the fact that prior to
six months of age, infants have not achieved object permanence."° Despite the results of numerous studies, the general public continues to believe in the concept of early parent-infant bonding.' 0 ' Based upon an
examination of cases and statutes, it would seem that judges, legislators,
and attorneys share this misconception.° 2
A second category of relevant developmental research explores
whether there are any important differences in attachments to mothers
and fathers. Twenty-five years ago, the developmental community believed either that attachments to fathers did not occur or that any attachments to fathers were of trivial importance."0 3 As a consequence, very
little was written on the attachment of infants to fathers. This situation
has been rectified in the past quarter century, with numerous scientists
delving into the relationship of infants to their fathers.' 0 4 The clear reis that infants do form attachments to their
sult of extensive1 research
5
male caregivers. 0
95. See, e.g., Patzer v. Glaser, 396 N.W.2d 740 (N.D. 1986); Johnson v. Sullivan, 545 So.2d
1169 (La.App. 1989).
96. BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 93 at 18; BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS, supra
note 93 at 11.
97. See e.g. Lamb, Father-Infant and Mother-Infant Interaction in the First Year of Life, 48
CHILD DEVELOPMENT 167 (1977); Parke, Perspectives on Father-Infant Interaction, in HANDBOOK
OF INFANT DEVELOPMENT 549 (J. Osofsky ed. 1979); Lamb, The Development of Parent-Infant
Attachments in the First Two Years of Life, in THE FATHER-INFANT RELATIONSHIP: OBSERVATIONAL STUDIES IN THE FAMILY SETTING 21 (F. Pedersen ed. 1980).
98. See e.g. Lamb, Father-Infantand Mother-Infant Interaction,supra note 97; Lamb, The Development of Parent-InfantAttachments, supra note 97.
99. Id.
100. Parke, Perspectives, supra note 97.
101. Palkovitz, Sources of Father-InfantBonding Beliefs: Implicationsfor Childbirth Educators,
17 MATERNAL-CHILD NURSING JOURNAL 101 (1988).
102. See, e.g., Jermstad v. McNelis, 210 Cal.App.3d 528, 258 Cal.Rptr. 519 (1989).
103. Ricks, Father-Infant Interaction" A Review of Empirical Research, 34 FAM. REL. 505
(1985).
104. Pedersen, Yarrow, Anderson, & Cain, Conceptualizationof FatherInfluences in the Infancy
Period, in THE CHILD AND ITS FAMILY 45 (M. Lewis & L. Rosenblum eds. 1979); Radin, The
Influence of Fathers on Their Sons and Daughters, 8 SOCIAL WORK IN EDUCATION 77 (1986).
105. See, e.g., P. ADAMS, J. MILNER, & N. SCHREPF, FATHERLESS CHILDREN (1984); Jones,
Father-InfantRelationshipsin the First Year of Life, in DIMENSIONS OF FATHERHOOD 92 (S. Hanson & F. Bozett eds. 1985); Ricks, Father-InfantInteractions:A Review of Empirical Research, 34
FAM. REL. 505 (1985); Russell & Russell, Mother-Child and Father-ChildRelationshipsin Middle
Childhood, 58 CHILD DEV. 1573 (1987); Hanson & Bozett, Fatherhood:A Review and Resources, 36
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Young children may express their attachments to their male and female parents in different ways. A very common method of assessing attachment consists of exposing the child to potential stress, frequently in
the very unusual situation of being left alone for a short period of time in
an unfamiliar laboratory room with a stranger."°6 When the child's parents return to the room, the child's behavior serves as a measure of attachment. When distressed in these peculiar circumstances, children
often show preference for their mothers.' °7 Lamb suggested, however,
that this preference may reflect enhanced attachment to the primary
caregiver in times of stress, rather than to the female parent.10 8 Continued change in the delegation of child care duties might impact upon
these results."° When the children are not distressed, they approach
their fathers more than their mothers, presumably to engage in playful
behavior. "'
There are clearly discernable differences between parents in certain areas of parent-infant interaction. Perhaps the greatest distinction is that
mothers spend significantly more time with their children than do fathers.1"' Mothers tend to spend more overall time engaged in play with
their babies. "2 Fathers, however, spend a significantly higher proportion
of time engaged in play." I3 Another difference between mothers and fathers is that babies display more affiliative behaviors toward their fathers
333 (1987); Kaitz, Good, Rokem, & Eidelman, Mothers' and Fathers' Recognition of
their Newborns' PhotographsDuring the Postpartem Period,9 DEV'L AND BEHAV'L PEDIATRICS 223
(1988).
FAM. REL.

106.

M. AINSWORTH, M. BLEHAR, E. WATERS, & S. WALL, PATTERNS OF ATTACHMENT

(1978).
107. Bridges, Connell, & Belsky, SimilaritiesandDifferences in Infant-Mother and Infant-Father
Interaction in the Strange Situation: A Component Process Analysis, 24 DEV'L PSYCHOLOGY 92
(1988).
108. Lamb, The Development of Parent-InfantAttachments, supra note 97; Lamb, Fathers and
Child Development: An Integrative Overview, in THE ROLE OF THE FATHER IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT (1981).
109. Lamb, The Development of Father-InfantRelationships, in THE ROLE OF THE FATHER IN
CHILD DEVELOPMENT 459 (1981); Lamb, The Changing Roles of Fathers, in THE FATHER'S ROLE:
APPLIED PERSPECTIVES 3 (1986); Hwang, Behavior of Swedish Primary and Secondary Caretaking
Fathers in Relation to Mother's Presence, 22 DEV'L PSYCHOLOGY 749 (1986); Thompson, Fathers
and the Child's "Best Interest" Judicial Decision Making in Custody Disputes, in THE FATHER'S
ROLE: APPLIED PERSPECTIVES 61 (M. Lamb ed. 1986).
110. Hanson & Bozett, supra note 105; Bridges, Connell, & Belsky, supra at note 107.

111. Parke & Tinsley, The Father'sRole in Infancy: Determinants of Involvement in Caregiving
and Play, in THE ROLE OF FATHER IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT 429 (M. Lamb ed. 1981); Santrock &

Warshak, Development, Relationships, and Legal/Clinical Considerationsin Father-Custody Families, in THE FATHER'S ROLE: APPLIED PERSPECTIVES 135 (M. Lamb ed. 1986); Levy-Shiff, Sharir,

& Mogilner, Mother- and Father-PretermInfant Relationship in the Hospital Preterm Nursery, 60
CHILD DEV. 93 (1989).

112. Hanson & Bozett, supra note 105.
113. Clarke-Stewart, The Father's Contribution to Children's Cognitive and Social Development
in Early Childhood, in THE FATHER-INFANT RELATIONSHIP: OBSERVATIONAL STUDIES IN THE

FAMILY SETTING 111 (F. Pedersen ed. 1980); Lamb, Fathers and Child Development, supra note
108; Bronstein, Differences in Mothers' and Fathers' Behaviors Toward Children: A Cross-Cultural
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than toward their mothers." 4 Clarke-Stewart suggested that fathers display a more engaging style of play, which makes them more salient playmates to their children.'" 5
Fathers engage in a more physical form of play, whereas mothers use
more vocal play patterns, physical contact and toys." 6 Mothers typically incorporate more smiling, more imitative grimaces, and highpitched imitative vocalizations into their playtimes." 7 Fathers who are
primary caregivers also exhibit these characteristics." 8 Very recent research would suggest that the setting greatly influences the form of play
adopted by a parent. Fathers in playrooms stocked with books and other
quiet toys utilize a more maternal form of play whereas mothers play in a
typically paternal way in settings conducive to a physical and active play
style. 9 Similarly, each parent alters his or her characteristic speech pattern to emulate the pattern used by the other parent in the appropriate
play context.' 20 Both in the amount of play and the style of play,
mothers and fathers are easily differentiated, but the differences may be
diminished by context. Fathers and mothers readily2 1adapt to the needs
of their children and the demands of the situation.'
Parke and Tinsley demonstrated that fathers rock their infants in their
arms more so than do mothers. 22 They concluded that fathers are just
as involved in interaction with their young infants as mothers, when they
are given the opportunity to be so involved. Fathers have been found to
spend less time than mothers in the context of feeding their newborns but
are equally sensitive and responsive to cues displayed by their infants
during feeding. 2 a There are no differences in measures of affection, reComparison, 20 DEV'L PSYCHOLOGY 995 (1984); Hanson & Bozett, supra note 105; Russell & Russell, supra note 105; Levy-Shiff, Sharir, & Mogilner, Mother- and Father-Preterm,supra note I11.
114. Lamb, Effects of Stress and Cohort on Mother- and Father-InfantInteraction, 12 DEV'L
PSYCHOLOGY 435 (1976); Lamb, The Development of Parent-InfantAttachments, supra note 97; P.
ADAMS, J. MILNER, & N.SCHREPF, supra note 105.

115. Clarke-Stewart, The Father's Contribution, supra note 113.
116. Clarke-Stewart, And Daddy Makes Three, in READINGS ON INFANCY 204 (J. Belsky ed.
1982); Ricks, supra note 103; Radin, Influence of Fathers, supra note 104; Teti, Bond, & Gibbs,
Mothers, Fathers, and Siblings: A Comparison of PlayStyles and Their Influence upon Infant Cognitive Level, 11 INT'L J. OF BEHAV. DEV. 415 (1988).
117. Hwang, supra note 109.
118. Thompson, The Father'sCase in Child Custody Disputex"The Contributionsof Psychological
Research, in FATHERHOOD AND FAMILY POLICY 53 (M. Lamb & A. Sagi eds. 1983); Hwang, supra
note 109.
119. Ross & Taylor, Do Boys Prefer Daddy or His Physical Style of Play?, 20 SEx ROLES 23
(1989).
120. Lewis & Gregory, Parents' Talk to Their Infants The Importance of Context, 7 FIRST LANGUAGE 201 (1987).
121. Steavenson, Leavitt, Thompson, & Roach, A Social Relations Model Analysis of Parent and
Child Play, 24 DEV'L PSYCHOLOGY 101 (1988); Ross & Taylor, supra note 119.
122. Parke & Tinsley, supra note 111.
123. Parke & Sawin, The Father'sRole in Infancy: A Re-Evaluation, 25 THE FAMILY COORDINATOR 365 (1976); Parke, Perspectives, supra note 97.
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sponsiveness, or effectiveness. 124
Mothers tend to vocalize more to their infants than do fathers. 2 5
Their vocalization patterns also differ, in that mothers use repetitive patterns more often than fathers, who in turn use more rhythmic touching
patterns than do mothers. 26 Despite differences in speech patterns, both
to contextual cues of the infants in regulating these
parents are sensitive
127
speech patterns.

A number of recent studies have compared techniques used by fathers
and mothers in teaching skills to their infants. Fathers tend to use more
imperative speech and their utterances are longer than those used by
mothers.12 Fathers also ask more questions of their children during instruction than do mothers. 1 29 The men in these studies were secondary
caretakers, suggesting that they may have been less aware of the capabilities of their children. Their relative unfamiliarity with their children's
abilities may have spawned more complete instructions and more frequent requests for feedback. Ninio and colleague found that fathers underestimate the developmental capabilities of their children. 130 There is
ample evidence to refute any suggestion that the low verbal involvement
displayed by most fathers1 denotes a general pattern of low paternal involvement with the child. 31

Although popularly considered as the lesser parent in terms of socialization and caregiving, 132 fathers appear to significantly influence a
number of facets of their infants' lives. The impact of fathers upon their
children has been found to be especially great in the areas of social competence and social responsibility. 133 Fathers also seem to foster sex role
124. Lamb, The Development of Father-InfantRelationships, supra note 109; Lamb, Fathersand
Child Development, supra note 108; Clarke-Stewart, And Daddy Makes Three, supra note 116;
Crummette, Thompson, & Beale, Father-InfantInteraction Program:Preparationfor Parenthood, 6
INFANT MENTAL HEALTH J. 89 (1985); Kaitz, Good, Rokem, & Eidelman, supra 105.
125. Hwang, supra note 109; Pedersen, Yarrow, Anderson, & Cain, supra note 104.
126. Yogman, Observationson the Father-InfantRelationship, in FATHER AND CHILD: DEVELOPMENT AND CLINICAL PERSPECTIVES 101 (S. Cath, A. Gurwitt, & J. Ross eds. 1982).
127. Parke & Tinsley, supra note I 1.
128. Brachfeld-Child, Simpson, & Izenson, Mothers' and Fathers'Speech to Infants in a Teaching Situation, 9 INFANT MENTAL HEALTH J. 173 (1988).
129. McGillicuddy-DeLisi, Sex Differences in Parental Teaching Behaviors, 34 MERRILLPALMER Q. 147 (1988).

130. Ninio, The Effects of CulturalBackground,Sex, and Parenthoodon Beliefs About the Timetable of Cognitive Development in Infancy, 34 MERRILL-PALMER Q. 369 (1988); Ninro & Rinott,
Fathers'Involvement in the Care of Their Infants and Their Attributions of Cognitive Competence to
Infants, 59 CHILD DEv. 652 (1988).

131. Parke, Perspectives, supra note 97.
132. Crummette, Thompson, & Beale, supra note 125; Vinovskis, Young Fathers and Their Children: Some Historical and Policy Perspectives, in ADOLESCENT FATHERHOOD 171 (A. Elster & M.
Lamb eds. 1986).

133. Parke, Perspectives, supra note 97; Clark-Stewart, The Father's Contribution, supra note
113; Lamb, The Development of Parent-InfantAttachments, supra note 97; Radin, Influence of Fa-
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development in their children.134 There is some evidence that both cognitive growth13 and the development of an internal locus of control are
associated with paternal involvement. 13 6 Similarly, Bridges reported reinfluences
sults which suggest that the father-child relationship
137strongly
the child's relationships with non-family members.
A scant number of studies have been devoted to fathers as sole
caregivers. The majority of the available studies consist of self-reports or
involve a self-selected sample; the results cannot be considered to be
generalizable to all unwed fathers.' 38 Especially pertinent this paper is
the fact that none of these studies focused solely upon men who had
assumed the role of fatherhood outside of marriage. Indeed, many did
not have any fathers of illegitimate children included in their samples of
single fathers. Therefore, as reiterated throughout the literature, caution
must be exercised in any attempt to generalize the findings from these
studies of doubtful methodological validity to a sample of unwed fathers
who are similar in some ways but vastly different in others.13 9 With this
warning firmly in mind, the father as sole caregiver will be explored.
The issue of the father's competency takes on increased salience when
considering him as the sole caregiver. The current literature unanimously confirms that men are quite capable of raising their children by
themselves. 14o
thers, supra note 104; Thompson, Child's "Best Interest",supra note 109; Dickstein & Parke, Social
Referencing in Infancy: A Glance at Fathers and Marriage,59 CHILD DEV. 506 (1988).
134. Lamb, Fathers and Child Development, supra note 108; Lamb, PaternalInfluences and the
Father'sRole: A PersonalPerspective, in SOCIALIZATION AND PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT 281 (E.

Zigler, M. Lamb, & I. Child eds. 1982); Radin, Influence of Fathers,supra note 104.
135. Parke, Perspectives,supra note 97; Lamb, Fathersand Child Development, supra note 108;
Radin, The Role of the Fatherin Cognitive, Academic, and Intellectual Development, in THE ROLE
OF THE FATHER IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT 379 (M. Lamb ed. 1981); Thompson, The Father'sCase,

supra note 118; Radin, Influence of Fathers,supra note 104; Bridges, Connell, & Belsky, supra note
107.
136. Lamb, The Development of Father-InfantRelationships, supra note 109; RADIN, PRIMARY
CAREGIVING AND ROLE-SHARING FATHERS IN NONTRADITIONAL FAMILIES 173 (M. Lamb ed.

1982); Lamb, ChangingRoles, supra note 109.
137. Bridges, Connell, & Belsky, supra note 107.
138. Berry, The Male Single Parent,in CHILDREN OF SEPARATION AND DIVORCE 34 (I. Stuart
& L. Abt eds. 1981); Hipgrave, Lone Fatherhood: A ProblematicStatus, in THE FATHER FIGURE
171 (L. McKee & M. O'Brien eds. 1982); Thompson, The Father's Case, supra note 118.
139. Gunsberg, Selected CriticalReview of PsychologicalInvestigations of the Early Father-Infant
Relationship, in FATHER AND CHILD IN DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVES 65 (S. Cath, A. Gurwitt,
& J. Ross eds. 1982).
140. Gasser & Taylor, Role Adjustment of Single Parent Fathers with Dependent Children, 25
THE FAM. COORDINATOR 397 (1976); Katz, Lone Fathers:Perspectivesand Implicationsfor Family
Policy, 28 THE FAM. COORDINATOR 521 (1979); Parke, Perspectives,supra note 97; R. PARKE, FATHERS (1981); Smith & Smith, Child-Rearingand Single-ParentFathers,30 FAM. REL. 411 (1981);
Hipgrave, supra note 138; Thompson, The Father's Case, supra note 118; G. GREIF, SINGLE FATHERS (1985); Hetherington & Hagan, Divorced Fathers" Stress, Coping, and Adjustment, in THE
FATHER'S ROLE: APPLIED PERSPECTIVES 103 (M. Lamb ed. 1986); Thompson, Child's "Best Inter-

est", supra note 109.
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When fathers assume sole responsibility for their children, they seem
to develop a style which straddles the more physically playful mode of
secondary caregiving fathers and the gentle, affectionate manner used by
mothers.14 1 Children raised by single fathers appear to thrive in this arrangement, at least as well as children raised by single mothers. 142As
Cashmore so eloquently stated, "one good parent is sufficient for a child's
upbringing and men are able
to fill the bill as adequately as most women,
'maternal instinct' or not."1 43
Those fathers who choose to be primary or sole caregivers adjust very
well to this role. 1" Because of the obstacles unwed fathers must overcome to participate in any way in decision-making regarding their children, they are probably deeply committed to the role of fatherhood.
Virtually no research has compared married and divorced fathers to
unwed fathers. Thus, there is no support for the proposition that unwed
fathers are somehow less capable than other fathers. Courts often appear
to be motivated by a sense that
unwed fathers should be punished for
45
their status as unwed fathers.1
A fair summary of the results of numerous studies is that mothers and
fathers do not differ much in caregiving ability. None of the studies of
the differences between parents in play or vocalizations have led researchers to conclude that either parent is clearly best suited as the primary caregiver. Instead, most researchers and commentators have
explained that there is a great overlap of child care style between mothers
and fathers and that individualized characteristics unrelated to the sex of
the parent account for the majority of the variation in parenting behavior.'" The most prevalent conclusion regarding sex differences and
parenting is that both males and females are equally capable of nurturing
children. 47
'
141. Hwang, supra note 109; Thompson, Child's "Best Interest", supra note 109.
142. Berry, supra note 138; Hetherington & Hagan, supra note 140; Jacobs, Fatherhood and
Divorce: A Review of the Psychiatric Literature, in DIVORCE AND FATHERHOOD: THE STRUGGLE

FOR PARENTAL IDENTITY 2 (1986); Risman, Can Men "Mother'?: Life as a Single Father,35 Faro.
Rel. 95 (1986); Guttman, The Divorced Father:A Review of the Issues and the Research, 20 J. OF THE
CoMP. FAM. STUD. 247 (1989).
143. Cashmore, Men Alone, in HAVING To: THE WORLD OF ONEPARENT FAMILIES 245, 247

(1985).
144. Thompson, The Father's Case, supra note 118; Pruett, Oedipal Configurationsin Young
Father-Raised Children, 40 PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF THE CHILD 435 (1985).
145. See, e.g., Adoption of G., 529 A.2d 809 (Me. 1987); Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Services
Bureau, Inc., 222 Neb. 574, 385 N.W.2d 448 (1986).
146. Field, Interaction Behaviors of Primary and Secondary CaretakerFathers, 14 DEV'L PSYCHOLOGY 183 (1978); Sawin, Fathers' Interactionswith Infants, in INFANTS: THEIR SOCIAL ENVIRONMENTS 147 (B. Weissbourd & J. Musick eds. 1981); RADIN, PRIMARY CAREGIVING, supra note
136; G. RUSSELL, THE CHANGING ROLE OF FATHERS? (1983); Ricks, supra note 105; Levy-Shiff &

Israelashvili, Antecedents of Fathering: Some Further Exploration, 24 DEV'L PSYCHOLOGY 434
(1988); Teti, Bond, & Gibbs, supra note 116.
147. Pedersen, Overview: Answers and Reformulated Questions, in THE FATHER-INFANT RELA-
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CONCLUSION

Denial of parental rights to unwed fathers on the basis of sex alone is
not supported by the social science literature. Mechanisms must be developed whereby unwed fathers are judged on their fitness to parent, just
as are other parents. Many of the current systems for determining paternal rights place undue stress on status and outmoded views of fathers'
abilities. A preferable system would consist of reasonable efforts to ascertain the identity of the father, notification of the identified father when
adoption proceedings are pending, and opportunity for the father to present his concerns at the proceeding. Because the right to raise one's children is fundamental,14 when there are disputes between parties seeking
custody of children born out of wedlock, unwed fathers should prevail
over third parties, barring paternal unfitness. Although this rule may
initially result in instances in which children are returned to their fathers
after the formation of attachments to adoptive parents, fundamental fairness demands that unwed fathers' rights be protected. Once unwed fathers' rights are considered as a matter of course before placement for
adoption, these unfortunate occurrences will be significantly diminished.
Consideration of unwed fathers' rights need not require placement of the
child with the father in every case. As with other parents, a judicial
finding of an unwed father's unfitness would be sufficient to terminate his
parental rights.14 9
Cases of retroactive removal of children from adoptive homes will undoubtedly generate protests that the potential harm to these children necessitates the denial of unwed fathers' rights in these cases.
Commentators may assert that when a child has already formed attachments to adoptive parents, the child should remain in the custody of
these parents regardless of the court's determination that the unwed father's rights were violated. Under this view, protection of unwed fathers'
rights would be restricted to future cases; however, such an approach
disregards the fundamental nature of parental rights. The lengthy appeals process would promote the formation of attachment to adoptive
parents to the detriment of unwed fathers, effectively denying the majority of them their fundamental rights.IS0 Restriction to prospective cases
TIONSHIP: OBSERVATIONAL STUDIES IN THE FAMILY SETTING 147 (1980); Clarke-Stewart, The

Father's Contribution, supra note 113; Lewis, The Observation of Father-Infant Relationships; An
'Attachment' to Outmoded Concepts in THE FATHER FIGURE 120 (L. McKee & M. O'Brien eds.
1982); G. RUSSELL, THE CHANGING ROLE OF FATHERS? (1983); Thompson, Child's "Best Interest", supra note 109; Lamb & Elster, ParentalBehavior ofAdolescent Mothers and Fathers, in ADOLESCENT FATHERHOOD (1986); Jacobs, supra note 142.
148. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Prince
v.Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
149. See, e.g., 3 L. WARDLE, C. BLAKESLEY, & J. PARKER, supra note I at § 28.08.
150. See, e.g., Adoption of G., 529 A.2d 809 (Me. 1987); State v. S.O., 725 S.W.2d 601 (Mo.
App. 1986).
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is, therefore, insufficient protection for unwed fathers; retrospective removal of children from adoptive homes is essential.
Courts often support their decisions by stating that the disposition is in
the best interest of the child.151 The best interest standard makes the
welfare of the child the primary consideration, but provides few specific
guidelines.' 5 2 The paucity of guidance confers unfettered discretion
upon judges who have little choice but to render decisions based upon
personal biases. Therefore, to maximize the quality of judicial decisionmaking, the best interest standard should only be applied when more
definite standards are unavailable. When fit parties seeking custody have
comparable rights with respect to the child, the best interest standard is
appropriate. This standard is not appropriate in determining the parental rights of fit natural parents as against third parties.' 3 In such cases,
the natural parent should prevail. Marital status and gender should not
alter this result. Generally, fit unwed mothers are not subjected to the
best interest standard in custody disputes with third parties. Unwed fathers should be accorded comparable treatment.
Certain jurisdictions already place great weight on the protection of
unwed fathers' rights in adoption proceedings."5 4 For example, in granting an unwed father custody of his child, the Louisiana Supreme Court
stated the following:
[n]o one would argue that the weight of a mother's right to the custody of
her child should be reduced simply because she is not married to the
child's father and has not performed a formal act of legitimation.
There may be a misguided tendency to view the situation in a different
light when the parent whose right is at stake is the father, but this is so
only because of a failure to distinguish between the right which flows
from the fact of parenthood... and the possibility of a subsequent forfeiture of parenthood through abandonment or neglect. 5
Unfortunately, numerous courts continue to require unwed fathers to
meet a higher standard of responsibility for their children in order to
trigger recognition of their parental rights. The assumptions which seem
151. See, e.g., Dilemma, supra note 1; 4 L. WARDLE, C. BLAKESLEY, & J. PARKER, supra note I
at § 39.06.
152. See, e.g., 4 L. WARDLE, C. BLAKESLEY, & J. PARKER, supra note I at § 39.06 ("mhe best
interest of the child standard is inherently indeterminate. It is doubtful that guidelines or lists of
factors are really workable, if they are designed to control judicial discretion; certainly the judges
utilize their own consciences, shaped by the values of the culture and mores in which they function.
Neither statutes nor case law generally specify the relative weight the various factors... are to have,
so it remains... amorphous and subject to the discretion of the judge.").
153. See, e.g., Brooks v. Carson, 390 S.E.2d 859 (Ga. App. 1990).
154. See, e.g., In re. Hutto, 777 S.W.2d 353 (Tenn. App. 1989); In re. R.M.H., 538 So.2d 477
(Fla. 1989) (opinion of Campbell, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Baby Girl Eason,
257 Ga. 292, 358 S.E.2d 459 (1987); Deville v. LaGrange, 388 So.2d 696 (La. 1980); Kambitch v.
Ederle, 642 S.W.2d 690 (1982); Vanlue v. Collins, 779 P.2d 163 (Or. App. 1989).
155. Deville v. LaGrange, 388 So.2d 696, 698 (La. 1980).
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to be relied upon by judges and legislators in their decisions concerning
the rights of unwed fathers are not borne out by the developmental literature. Statutes should be altered to take research into consideration. The
legal profession should be educated as to the relevant research and its
limitations. Social scientists should be made aware of the conflicting
rights implicated by the legal resolution of disputes involving unwed fathers. Until these issues are addressed, children, adoptive parents, and
natural parents will face uncertainty and disruptive legal battles.
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